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The European Monetary Union (EMU) had a long history before 
the single currency, the euro, was introduced in 1999, but the entry of the 
actual euro banknotes and coins into circulation on 1 January 2002 made 
the idea of EMU both very real and seemingly irrevocable. Eleven states 
qualified to join the euro upon its launch in 1999, with Greece joining as the 
twelfth member in 2001.1 Of the ten states that joined the European Union 
(EU) on 1 May 2004, Slovenia became the first to qualify to adopt the euro, 
on 1 January 2007, and that experience will be the focus of this paper.2 
Slovenia is a young state, having gained independence in 1991 
from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and having 
previously been ruled by a succession of foreign powers including the 
Franks, the Venetians, the Hapsburgs, Napoleon, Fascist Italy, Nazi 
Germany, Hungary and the Serbian monarchy. Having achieved full 
sovereignty only recently, it might seem strange that independent Slovenia 
almost immediately sought EU (and NATO) membership. Perhaps the 
Slovenes believe in the idea of safety in numbers: With only two million 
Slovenes and a long history of uneasy relations with (if not outright 
domination by) their neighbors, the assurance of equality with the other 
nations of Europe within the political structure of the European Union must 
seem like a good deal.  
Whatever the motivation, Slovenia quickly emerged as the best-
prepared candidate country by the time of its actual accession to EU 
membership, became the first of the new members to adopt the euro just 
two and a half years later, and capped off its achievements by being the first 
of the new members to hold the rotating presidency of the EU, from January 
to June 2008. 
                                                
1  The founding members of the eurozone were: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. 
2  The others joining in 2004 were Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovakia. Bulgaria, and 
Romania have also since joined the EU, in 2007. Both Cyprus and Malta 
adopted the euro in 2008, and Slovakia in 2009.  
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The paper is organized as follows: the first section after this 
introduction reviews optimum currency area (OCA) theory, followed by a 
section looking closely at the Maastricht criteria. The fourth section looks at 
the mechanics of the Slovene accession to the eurozone, while the fifth 
section discusses the political connotations of the symbology used on the 
euro banknotes and coins themselves, particularly with regard to Slovenia. 
The sixth section briefly looks at what has happened in the Slovene 
economy in the first eighteen months after adopting the euro. Finally the 
conclusion notes the implications of Slovenia’s experience for candidate 
countries and ponders whether the Maastricht criteria have outlived their 
usefulness.  
 
II. Optimum currency area theory and EMU 
The underpinnings of European Monetary Union should be the 
theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). Robert Mundell, the major 
theorist in this area, developed his ideas in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
when the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate regime still existed. His “A 
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” published in late 1961, was part of a 
debate between advocates of the fixed-exchange rate regime and those who 
preferred flexible exchange rates. Rather than taking sides, however, 
Mundell instead concentrated on the question of when it makes sense to 
move from flexible to fixed exchange rates, or rather on the question of 
what are “the conditions that countries should satisfy to make a monetary 
union attractive, i.e. to ensure that the benefits of the monetary union 
exceed its costs” (De Grauwe 2006: 712). 
One of the key insights in Mundell (1961) is that in order to be an 
OCA, an area must not be prone to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks 
since the easiest recourse following such a shock is intervening in the 
foreign exchange markets to alter the exchange rate. This is not an option 
for the affected area if it is in a monetary union. The only other way to 
adjust is by moving labor, but labor mobility is notoriously hard to achieve 
and usually not a viable option. 
But Mundell also notes that the more open an economy is, the less 
useful the exchange rate will be as an adjustment mechanism. Large, closed 
economies are able to use it effectively, but small, open economies can not 
and therefore they would stand to loose very little by joining a monetary 
union. This point was illustrated by Frankel through his “Impossible 
Trinity” (figure 1), which states that it is impossible to simultaneously have 
(1) an independent monetary policy, (2) perfect capital mobility, and (3) 
fixed exchange rates (Frankel 1999: 7). An economy can be at any two 
points on the diagram, but not all three at the same time. Currently, the 
trend of increased global capital mobility is pushing towards the bottom of 
the diagram and away from full capital control, leaving pure floating 
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exchange rates and monetary union (fixed exchange rates) as the only 
options. So if a small, open economy cannot make effective use of 
monetary independence anyway, monetary union emerges as a viable 
option.  
 
Figure 1. The Impossible Trinity (Frankel 1999: 7). 
 
 
Frankel (1999) also uses another useful illustration (figure 2) that 
establishes what he terms the “OCA Line.” He establishes the key 
parameters of an OCA as being the “correlation of incomes among 
members of a group” and the “extent of trade among members of a group,” 
and the OCA line itself represents the combinations of the two parameters 
at which point the benefits of joining a monetary union outweigh the costs. 
The first parameter relates to the degree of symmetry in the economies 
considering the monetary union: the more economies are symmetrical, the 
less an adjustment mechanism is needed. Similarly, the more trade between 
two economies, the less symmetry is required, but, logically speaking, such 
a low degree of symmetry would itself argue against the formation of a 
monetary union because of the increased potential for asymmetric shocks. 
According to Frankel’s reckoning, of the states that have joined 
eurozone, only Germany and the Benelux actually fall on the side of the 
OCA line where the benefits outweigh the costs; Greece (a member of the 
eurozone), and Denmark, Sweden and the UK (not members of the 
eurozone) all fall on the side where the costs outweigh the benefits (figure 
2). De Grauwe (2006) builds upon Frankel’s OCA line image (figures 3 and 
4), but alternates the trade parameter first with flexibility, and then with 
integration (defined similar to Frankel’s trade parameter).  
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Figure 2. Two key parameters in the OCA Criterion (Frankel 1999: 14). 
 
 
De Grauwe (2006) nicely traces the evolution of what led to the 
ultimate realization of EMU. While the idea of EMU had been around for 
decades, based on Mundell (1961) “[t]he presumption of many economists 
at the end of the 1980s was that the EU countries should be located to the 
left of the OCA lines in (figures 3 and 4)—i.e., given the degree of 
integration achieved in the EU there was still too much asymmetry and too 
little flexibility for the EU to form a monetary union whose benefits would 
exceed the costs” (De Grauwe 2006: 714). This began to change in the early 
1990s with the collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS), a post-
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime for European Economic 
Community members. “The EMS-crisis convinced many continental 
European economists that a choice had to be made for one of the two 
‘corner solutions’ in exchange rate regimes, i.e. full flexibility of exchange 
rates or monetary union. Many decided that the latter would be the least bad 
choice” (De Grauwe 2006: 715). 
That decision was bolstered by the elaboration of a new OCA 
theory based on a little-known paper Mundell published in 1973 that De 
Grauwe (2006) terms “Mundell II.” Here, the main idea is that floating 
exchange rates can be a major liability insofar as they can be “a target of 
destabilizing speculative movements and thus a source of asymmetric 
shocks.” By this logic, then, there is nothing to lose in giving up an 
exchange rate but rather everything to be gained insofar as the economy 
will be “eliminating a source of asymmetric shocks” (speculative attacks) 
(De Grauwe 2006: 714). Further, integrated capital markets within a 
monetary union actually operate as an “insurance mechanism against 
THE SLOVENE EURO 175 
asymmetric shocks” further sweetening the idea of monetary union (De 
Grauwe 2006: 715).  
 




Figure 4. Symmetry and Integration as OCA Criteria (De Grauwe 2006: 
713).  
 
Mundell II was a monetarist theory stressing “that activist 
monetary policies become sources of instability and that central banks 
should focus on their core business which is to maintain price stability,” 
whereas Mundell I was Keynesian, “stressing that in a world of price and 
wage rigidities monetary policies, including exchange rate policies, can be 
used effectively to stabilize the economy” (De Grauwe 2006: 715). 
Monetarism was ascendant in the late 1980s, and this further facilitated the 
adoption of Mundell II and accelerated the final drive for EMU.  
Ultimately, however, the final decision appears to have been a 
political tradeoff between France, leading a monetarist camp that believed a 
quick monetary union would lessen the overall cost, and Germany, leading 
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an economist camp that still felt monetary union would only be possible as 
the culmination of a long convergence process. With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, France feared that a change in the balance of power in Europe was in 
the offing. In order to ensure Germany’s continued involvement in the 
unification of Europe, the French gave EMU the final push, requiring that it 
go forward as quid pro quo for accepting German reunification. The victory 
of the monetarist camp was signed into EU law with the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992, which came into force on 1 November 1993. Feldstein 
(1997) was right on target when he wrote that 
the decision will not depend on the economic advantages and 
disadvantages of a single currency. The decision of whether or 
not to form a monetary union will reflect deeply held political 
views about the appropriate future for Europe and about the 
political advantages and disadvantages to the individual 
countries and even to the individual political decisionmakers 
themselves… The actual decision will depend overwhelming-
ly on the preferences of the German and French political 
leaders. (Feldstein 1997: 23) 
And that is exactly what happened.  
 
III. The Maastricht Criteria 
Apart from providing the legal basis for EMU, the 1992 treaty also 
set the so-called Maastricht criteria that would determine when a country 
was ready to enter the final stage of EMU, the single-currency eurozone. 
The four criteria are:  
1. an annual rate of inflation no greater than 1.5 percentage points 
higher than the average of the three lowest rates in the European 
Union (i.e., not just among eurozone members); 
2. two criteria related to government finance: (a.) a budget deficit no 
greater than 3% of annual GDP; and (b.) government debt no 
greater than 60% of annual GDP; 
3. at least two years spent in ERM (exchange rate mechanism) II with 
normal fluctuations (± 15% of a central rate against the euro), 
without a devaluation; and 
4. long-term nominal interest rates on government debt no greater 
than two percentage points above than the average of the three 
lowest-inflation countries’ interest rates (again, among EU 
members rather than eurozone members). 
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There were also a few relatively minor technicalities, such as the fact that 
the central bank must be independent of political interference, and national 
legislation must be harmonized. 
Clearly, these criteria do not have any connection to either 
Mundell I or Mundell II. “Only the fiscal criteria have any hope of being 
rationalisable in terms of optimal currency area considerations, and even 
there the connection is weak: the two Maastricht fiscal criteria are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for fiscal sustainability” (Buiter and Sibert 2006b: 
5). There is nothing about unemployment, symmetry of economies, and so 
on. Even more troubling is the fact that the Maastricht criteria are not hard-
and-fast rules but rather have proven easily malleable with sufficient 
political will: 
So although the Germans had insisted on having “black tie 
only” on the invitations, everyone who wanted to join was 
admitted. The Belgians came in their lounge suits. The Italians 
and Greeks didn’t even have a jacket or tie! The whole 
episode demonstrated the political nature of the euro project, 
rather than any long-run economic viability. Believe it or not, 
more countries are lining up to join the euro today. Some are 
waiting outside the club dressed in jeans and trainers. (Durrant 
2006) 
Nevertheless, this may not be such a big problem if one adheres to 
a belief in endogenous optimum currency areas, which holds that economies 
that enter into a monetary union do not have to form an OCA from the start 
but will become one ex post facto by virtue of the monetary union itself. 
There are risks, however, given the Krugman Exception which holds that 
the specialization of regions in a monetary union creates asymmetries that 
actually take the union further away from forming an OCA (Frankel 1999: 
24–26; De Grauwe and Mongelli: 2004). For now, though, it does seem that 
the eurozone is moving closer to becoming an OCA endogenously. 
Euro supporters certainly would hasten to point out here that, 
despite the shoddy economics, the political fait accompli is a positive step 
for another reason: “…the single currency has had the psychological effect 
of binding together the Continent, easing cross-border purchases for 
consumers and reducing the cost of transactions” (Bilefsky and Wood 
2006). Feldstein (1997) made a similar observation, though perhaps not 
with much optimism: “[t]here can be no doubt that eliminating individual 
currencies would be a major psychological and substantive step towards a 
European central government” (Feldstein 1997: 24). 
Given the political nature of EMU and the lack of relevant, 
stringent criteria, it is puzzling that the states that joined the EU in 2004 and 
2007 were not included in the eurozone immediately but rather have been 
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compelled to work towards fulfilling the Maastricht criteria (that many 
current eurozone members themselves no longer fulfill—if they ever did in 
the past). Moreover, the discussion of OCA theory above fully supports the 
position of Buiter and Sibert:  
[f]rom the point of view of the economic fundamentals 
emphasized by optimal currency area theory, it is in the 
interest of all eight new Central European members (the CE8) 
to join the Eurozone as soon as possible. They are all too 
small, too open and too vulnerable to speculative attacks 
against their national currencies to be optimal currency areas. 
For the smallest ones among them, it is indeed doubtful 
whether a national currency is a viable option in the medium 
to long run. (2006b: 2) 
Because the EU has insisted on maintaining the Maastricht criteria and 
interpreting them more strictly for potential members than for current 
members, the accession process has been slow going. In 2006, as will be 
described below, Slovenia was allowed to join the eurozone on 1 January 
2007, while Lithuania was excluded for only a minor deviation (an inflation 
rate of 2.7 percent, just 0.1 percent over the limit at that time). Both Cyprus 
and Malta joined on 1 January 2008 and Slovakia on 1 January 2009. For 
the rest, eurozone membership must wait, despite the risks to the candidate 
states and the low probable cost to the existing members. 
 
IV. Slovene accession 
In 2006, Slovenia became the first of the new EU members 
permitted to join the eurozone, after years of working towards fulfilling the 
Maastricht criteria. The accession process culminated in convergence 
reports issued by the European Commission and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) in 2006, which led to an invitation by the European Council to join 
the final stage of EMU and, finally, to adopt the euro.  
The convergence report of the European Commission reviewed the 
harmonization of national legislation, went through each of the Maastricht 
criteria and evaluated progress since the previous convergence report 
undertaken in 2004. Sufficient progress was deemed to have been made on 
harmonization of legislation. Price stability was recorded at 4.1 percent, 
well above the 2.4 percent limit in 2004, but the twelve-month average in 
March 2006 was just 2.3 percent against the now 2.6 percent limit; Slovenia 
fulfilled the inflation criterion. The two criteria related to government 
finance were already fulfilled in 2004, and continued to be so in 2006. 
While Slovenia had only been in ERM II for two months at the time of the 
2004 report, by 2006 it had successfully stayed in ERM II for twenty-two 
months and has “stayed close to the central rate with maximum deviations 
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of 0.16 percent on the depreciation side and 0.10 percent on the 
appreciation side of the fluctuation band.” Finally, Slovenia had also 
fulfilled the interest rate criterion in 2004, and in 2006 it did so again, with 
its 3.8 percent rate well below the 5.9 percent limit. The report concluded: 
“In the light of its assessment on the fulfillment of the convergence criteria, 
the Commission considers that Slovenia has achieved a high degree of 
sustainable convergence” (European Commission 2006). The ECB 
convergence report echoed that of the EC. The ECB did not make a final 
recommendation, but it was clear that Slovenia had fulfilled all of the 
criteria for membership in the eurozone.  
On 11 July 2006 the European Council—or more specifically the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN)—accepted the two 
convergence reports and announced that it had decided to allow Slovenia to 
join the eurozone, effective 1 January 2007 (Council of the European Union 
2006). Six months were thus provided to organize the changeover from the 
Slovene currency, the tolar (SIT). 
The method chosen for the changeover was the so-called “Big 
Bang” approach—the “irrevocable locking of the exchange rate and 
simultaneous introduction of the euro banknotes and coins.” As of 1 
January 2007, the euro and the tolar circulated simultaneously, with the 
tolar to lose its position as legal tender after two weeks (though tolars can 
still be exchanged for euros even today at the national bank). Ultimately, 
“[m]ore than 80% of the tolar banknotes, in value, had been returned to the 
Slovenian central bank by 11 January 2007, compared with only 40% of the 
legacy notes in the first wave of countries (i.e., 2002)” (European 
Commission 2007).  
One of the few issues that emerged during that process, though 
minor, stemmed from the fact that the final exchange rate was set at SIT 
239 = 1€, making for some difficult math for consumers. The government 
foresaw this, however, and distributed 760,000 free calculators which seems 
to have worked (Bilefsky and Wood 2006). The fact that prices legally had 
to be displayed in both tolars and euro (at the central parity exchange rate) 
beginning as early as 1 March 2006 was a further help. 
The Commission was upbeat: “The changeover to the euro in 
Slovenia was a swift and smooth affair and although the price of some 
goods and services increased, overall inflation has remained broadly 
stable….” It was also noted that not only did the “Big Bang” approach 
work, but it appeared to work better than the gradual process used when the 
euro was first introduced in 1999, with euro coins and banknotes only being 
distributed beginning in 2002. The Commission took this as a lesson for 
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future enlargements, since it was useful for “minimising costs and burdens 
on businesses” (European Commission 2007).3 
Another factor contributing to the successful changeover was the 
“fact that Slovenians were already familiar with the euro owing, in 
particular, to their proximity with euro–area members Austria and Italy,” 
which also bodes well for future enlargements, since many of the other 
likely candidates also will be familiar with the currency from their eurozone 
neighbors (European Commission 2007).  
Slovenes themselves were enthusiastic about the coming of the 
euro, though a general fear of price hikes was omnipresent. The 
Commission judged this to have been overstated. While some “unusual 
rises” were noted, the overall effect was minimal: 
Based on the preliminary information reported by the 
Slovenian statistics office, Eurostat puts the total impact of the 
changeover on consumer price inflation during and after the 
changeover period at 0.3 percentage points, which is similar to 
the experience of the first-wave changeover. A separate study 
by the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 
of Slovenia estimated the effect of the changeover on inflation 
at 0.24 percentage points. (European Commission 2007) 
Nevertheless, beginning in April 2006 the Slovene Statistical 
Office had undertaken a special project specifically designed to detect euro-
related price hikes, and found little of note – until the month before the 
changeover. At that time, various prices rose primarily due to the “upward 
rounding of prices” largely to account for the awkward tolar-euro exchange 
rate. The biggest incidents concerned prices in restaurants and cafes, which 
spiked up to 3.2 percent and eclipsed the previous high-water mark for 
previous Decembers, 0.3 percent in 2003. The greatest spikes were logged 
for hors d’oeuvres (4.8 percent) and desserts (4.5). “According to 
information given by restaurant owners, some of them raised their prices 
because they had not raised them for some time, while for some restaurants 
and cafes one could notice that their prices increased due to euro 
changeover” (Statistični urad Republike Slovenije 2007b).  
A similar project was undertaken by the Slovene Consumers’ 
Association (ZPS) and the International Consumer Research Institute 
(MIPOR), which began monitoring the prices of a set basket of goods and 
services in February 2006. Similar to the Statistical Office’s findings, 
“[p]rice increases did not start to show up until November 2006” (Deloitte 
                                                
3  It must be noted, however, that the small size of the country surely facilitated 
the process, and so it remains unclear whether this approach would be as 
smooth in a larger country. 
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Consulting 2007: 45). Consumers themselves were encouraged to send in 
the price hikes they themselves noticed, and from 29 December 2006 to 10 
January 2007 more than 750 tips had been contributed. A black list of 
companies that had increased prices by 6% or more was released on the 
basis of this survey data in December 2006 (Deloitte Consulting 2007: 45).4 
Overall, however, their findings were not too dramatic:  
…between February 2006 and February 2007, 42% of prices 
for services remained constant, 8% decreased and 50% went 
up. The corresponding figures for goods were 39%, 26% and 
35%. However, between November 2006 and February 2007, 
over the full basket, 56% of prices remained constant, 25% 
went down and 19% went up. For services, the corresponding 
figures were 52%, 8% and 40%; for goods, they were 58%, 
26% and 16%. (Deloitte Consulting 2007: 46) 
Unfortunately, Slovenes were already wary because of the 
experiences perceived in 2002 in nearby Italy and Austria, and all of the 
attention paid to the possibility of price hikes with the introduction of the 
euro seems to have left a negative impression and affected consumers’ price 
expectations. Despite the evidence to the contrary, “83.4% of consumers 
believed that prices went up with the introduction of the euro; 56% believed 
they went up significantly” (Deloitte Consulting 2007: 46). Notably, 
[t]he fact that increases tend to be in the cost of eating and 
drinking out, and in everyday personal services, which are 
often not contestable, inevitably creates a perception of higher 
prices, and the message about the overall limited level of price 
increases is not likely to counteract this perception. (Deloitte 
Consulting 2007: 6) 
This could be a problem in the future as the eurozone expands 
further, insofar as “[i]t is more than likely that other countries will therefore 
have to combat a further perpetuation of the idea that the introduction of the 
euro is inflationary…” (Deloitte Consulting 2007: 6). As far as Slovenia 
goes, the ZPS/MIPOR project may inadvertently have helped warp the 
general public’s perceptions, but at least one positive has been noted: the 
project has been credited with “(a) having been highly influential in making 
companies 'think twice' before increasing prices, and (b) developing a 
consumer rights' culture in Slovenia by raising awareness of a right to fair 
prices and a right to complain” (Deloitte Consulting 2007: 46–47). Future 
accession countries may do well to study this case. 
 
                                                
4  The project utilized the website www.evropotrosnik.si/, which unfortunately is 
no longer active. 
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V. Semiotics of the Slovene euro 
EMU and the Maastricht criteria are inherently political, but an 
even greater dose of politics can be found in the notes and coins themselves. 
This is to be expected, as theorists of nationalism have long observed the 
symbolic power of currency: “As a product of the state, money creates a 
link between the state’s political identity project and its citizens” (Raento et 
al. 2004: 930). The symbolic power of the euro should not be under-
estimated: “For Europeanists seeking a tool to forge a unified identity 
among diverse cultures, the answer was not to be found in a common 
language like Esperanto, but in a single currency” (McNiell 2004: 16). 
Since the banknotes and coins are used daily by most eurozone member 
state citizens, they become the focal point of that psychological effect.  
The banknotes are the same for all countries within the eurozone 
and each has a window or gateway on the front symbolizing “the European 
spirit of openness and cooperation,” and a bridge on the back symbolizing 
“communication between the people of Europe and between Europe and the 
rest of the world.”5 A different architectural style is used for each 
denomination, but none are explicitly identified with any known structure. 
At least one Slovene critic has questioned the design, noting that “…there 
is, indeed, something artificial about euro banknotes. They are—if we look 
at them clearly—completely lacking in character. To put it bluntly, they 
resemble a Europeanisation imposed from above” (Debeljak 2004: 104).6 
Further,  
Unlike national currencies, the euro is too timid to show a face 
and too reticent to suggest a biography, to give pride of place 
to any story. Not a single human being appears on these crisp 
banknotes. Incapable of inspiring any sense of recognition, of 
de fibula narratur, these notes are abstractions, ideas 
suggesting little, if any, tangible or familiar sensual 
quality…What we must sadly infer from the euro banknotes is 
that post-Maastricht Europe is a land with no founding event, 
destiny, or battle for independence… (Debeljak 2004: 104). 
The coins, however, are significantly different. One side of the 
coins, similar to the banknotes, has an image common to all member states. 
Prior to 1 January 2007, the two largest coins (i.e., €2 and €1) had a map of 
western Europe without borders and the next three largest coins (i.e., 50¢, 
20¢ and 10¢) had a map of EU member states with borders shown); after 1 
                                                
5  cf. www.ecb.int/bc/euro/banknotes/html/index.en.html.  
6  McNiell goes further: “…it remains true that despite the functioning of the 
Euro as a casual mode of European consciousness-building, the decisions 
which drive the Euro’s value and performance are being taken at a level ever 
more remote from European citizens” (2004: 16). 
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January 2007, all five coins now have a map of Europe (without borders) 
that includes the new members from Central and Eastern Europe. The three 
smallest coins (i.e., 5¢, 2¢ and 1¢) have a globe with Europe in the center.  
The second side, however, is more interesting in that it has an 
image chosen specifically by each participating member state. Raento 
(2004) has analyzed the national side of the euro coins of all member states 
and found that the identities of the member states come through in every 
case: “In one way or another, all national designs on euro coins are related 
to the state or the nation’s achievements and values,” while “the maps on 
the common side of the euro coins create a continuous link to the 
supranational ideal of politically and economically integrated, culturally 
harmonious Europe, thus supporting the political identity project behind the 
new currency” (Raento et al. 2004: 950–51).7 Each coin, therefore, 
reinforces the idea of a united Europe while simultaneously accentuating 
national specificities.  
Some states (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Vatican City) 
choose to use a single image on all eight coin denominations; most use three 
images; a few (Austria, Greece, Italy, and San Marino) have a different 
image on all eight coins. Slovenia has joined this last group.8 Most of the 
eight images are symbolic of Slovene culture: the national poet France 
Prešeren (€2), the father of the Slovene language Primož Trubar (€1), the 
country’s highest peak, Mount Triglav (50¢), and an parliament building 
(not constructed) by architect Jože Plečnik (10¢). Two more are relatively 
generic: a sower (5¢) and a stork (1¢). The remaining two, the Lipizzaner 
horses on the 20¢ piece and the Knežji kamen (Prince’s Stone) on the 2¢ 
piece were controversial.  
The Lipizzaner horses (figure 5) are relics of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (of which Slovenia was a part until 1918). While they come from a 
stud farm in Lipica (present-day Slovenia), they won fame at the Spanish 
Riding School in Vienna and as such are disputed between Slovenia and 
Austria with each country claiming the horses as their unique cultural 
heritage. On this issue, however, Austria was officially displeased but did 
not push the point. A government spokesperson told the BBC that “There 
were talks with Slovenia on that topic, but it is not a reason to interfere in 
good, friendly bilateral relations with Slovenia” (Mulvey 2006).  
 
                                                
7  Velikonja views this pessimistically: “…this is a good metaphor for equality 
within Europe and its respect for diversity. The expression of national 
peculiarities is limited to ‘small change,’ in this case euro coins, while 
important issues such as bank notes are subject to uniformity” (2005: 31, fn. 
71). 
8  cf. www.ecb.eu/bc/euro/coins/html/index.en.html. 
BRIAN POZUN 184 
Figure 5. Slovenia’s 20¢ euro coin: The Lipizzaners9 
 
 
The controversy over the Knežji kamen (figure 6), however, was 
not taken so lightly. The Knežji kamen was used in the medieval period in a 
ceremony for the installation of the prince of Karantanija and later the 
Duchy of Carinthia (conducted in the Slovene language) that was continued 
under the Franks and later the Austrians until it was finally abolished by 
Maria Theresa in the eighteenth century (Manske 2005).10 
Figure 6. Slovenia’s 2¢ euro coin: The Knežji kamen 
 
                                                
9  All images of Slovenia’s euro coins in this article are from www.evro.si/en/slo-
and-euro/slovene-euro-coins/slovene-euro-coins.pdf  
10  Manske 2005. 
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After World War I, however, much of the territory of the former 
Duchy of Carinthia fell to Austria, and the Knežji kamen today is held at the 
regional museum in Klagenfurt. Slovenes consider the Knežji kamen part of 
their political history and insist the use of the image is not a political 
message aimed at Austria, but Austrians in Carinthia feel the same and 
further believe that Slovenia’s attachment to the stone represents territorial 
aspirations to southern Carinthia (about 14,000 Slovenes still live there). 
“German-speaking Carinthians accept that the Slovene language was 
spoken at these enthronement ceremonies in the seventh century. But they 
also say that the stone and what it symbolizes has become an important part 
of Austrian-Carinthian regional identity” (Brix 2006).11 
The choice of the Knežji kamen for the two-cent piece therefore 
evoked a loud outcry led by Carinthia’s far-right-wing governor, Jorg 
Haider. Slovenes downplayed the controversy, with Carinthian Slovene 
leader Marjan Pipp, tongue in cheek, stating that “[w]hen one looks at the 
Austrian euro coins and finds different sorts of plants on them, one would 
also have to make sure that these grow exclusively in Austria” (Manske 
2005). It is worth mentioning that the Slovenes had tried to use the Knežji 
kamen on currency before, upon independence in 1991, but removed the 
image, after Austrian protests, in the interest of smoothing Slovenia’s entry 
into the European Union; now that Slovenia is a full member, it has 
successfully defended its claim and the Knežji kamen remains on the 
Slovene 2¢ euro coin despite the concerns emanating from Carinthia. 
A delay in the arrival of the euro coins to Slovenia in preparation 
for their 1 January 2007 entry into circulation explicitly highlighted the 
significance of the national side of the coins to member states. Slovenia’s 
coins—296.3 million of them, valued at €104 million and weighing 1465.2 
tons—were minted at the Mint of Finland. Though they began arriving in 
shipments of thirteen-week intervals as of 4 September 2006, there was 
concern that there would not be enough on the big day. Slovenia was lucky 
to be small: “minting coins is one of the most time-consuming aspects of 
the changeover process, and in a large country it can take well over a year 
or more to mint sufficient coins if only one mint is used” (Deloitte 
Consulting 2007: 25). 
There was talk early on of simply using another country’s coins to 
make up the difference, but, tellingly,  
this was a politically unacceptable solution even in a country 
with a high level of acceptance of the introduction of the euro. 
Indeed, creating an image of the new coins as one of being 
particularly attractive relative to other countries’ and 
                                                
11  Brix also notes the similarities between this controversy and the one between 
Macedonia and Greece over the name “Republic of Macedonia.” 
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emphasising the use of the Slovene language on the coins was 
seen as a key element in part of the preparations for the 
introduction of the euro and acceptance of the euro. Having 
photos of actual coins available for this purpose at the earliest 
possible stage was seen as important. (Deloitte Consulting 
2007: 25) 
Given the significance states place on the coins (more so than the 
banknotes), it is understandable but ultimately ironic that such controversies 
can and do arise with the euro, a tangible step towards European 
integration. Blix (2006) notes that it is interesting that “hardly anybody 
suggested looking at the issue from a European point of view (as a chance 
to promote common cultural heritage)” despite the obvious opportunity.12 
VI. Slovenia in the eurozone 
Since Slovenia formally adopted the euro as its currency, one thing 
became clear—inflation may have been kept under control in the run-up to 
the adoption, but it later emerged as a significant problem that could have 
repercussions for other potential eurozone members in the future, since 
“…Slovenia’s post-euro adoption inflation pattern is likely to be used as a 
benchmark by EU bodies for the next applicant from east-central Europe, 
Slovakia, and subsequently the larger east-central European countries.”13 
In the 2006 convergence reports, Slovenia secured a 2.3 percent 
twelve-month average rate of inflation in March 2006, 0.3 points lower than 
the 2.6 percent limit. In January 2007, at the time of the euro’s adoption, the 
rate had crept up to 2.8 percent and a few months later in July it was already 
at 4 percent—“more than double the euro area average, and over one 
percentage point higher than that of second-placed Greece.”14 One 
projection estimates the inflation rate for 2008 at around 5.3 percent.15 The 
public’s inflationary expectations seem to be perpetually adjusting upwards, 
                                                
12  There is another irony about the euro, as well: the insistence by the EU on the 
spelling of the very word. Slovene, along with Lithuanian, Latvian, Maltese 
and Hungarian, would naturally use “evro” rather than “euro,” and appealed to 
the ECB to do just that. Greece and Bulgaria were given exceptions, as they use 
different alphabets (cf. Reuters 2007). However, the ECB’s 2006 convergence 
report explicitly noted that “[o]nly when all national legal acts use the correct 
spelling of the word ‘euro’ will Slovenia comply with the Treaty 
requirements.” The Slovenes eventually bowed to the EU, as the “finance 
minister and the governor of the Bank of Slovenia were unanimous that the 
spelling euro should be used in official communications with European 
institutions and other member states, as well as on coins” while “in everyday 
life in Slovenia” the spelling evro will be maintained (Velikonja 2005: 31–32). 
13  The Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire, 14 September 2007. 
14  ibid. 
15  The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2008: 7. 
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with “[t]he price-perception component of the EU Commission’s monthly 
consumer survey for Slovenia … hitting new record highs in every month 
since November 2007, a sign that high inflation is becoming incorporated 
into household expectations.”16 
Part of the jump in January was attributed to euro-adoption price 
hikes, but that would not explain the further jump by July. To some extent it 
can be explained by increased energy prices: “the government has a clear 
case when it says the rise in overall inflation has been dictated by global 
factors such as higher prices for foodstuffs and energy.”17 A bigger 
problem, however, is that Slovenia has registered a higher rate of economic 
growth—hitting 6.1 percent in 2007 as compared to just 2.6 percent for the 
eurozone as a whole. 
This greater growth is inherently inflationary if it is beyond the 
country’s capacity, as the economy can fall out of internal balance and 
overheats, but Slovene authorities insist that the record-level inflation 
registered as of late is in fact a reflection of a strong economy rather than 
any significant trouble: 
Slovenia’s growth rate—6 per cent this year, a 10-year high, 
and an expected 4.6 per cent for 2008, according to European 
Commission forecasts—is comfortably above the European 
average. At 4.9 per cent unemployment is low. The country's 
export sector has grown robustly, up more than 17 per cent in 
the first nine months of this year, according to the finance 
ministry. However, such positive data have done little to 
dispel concerns about the underlying state of the economy. 
(Studemann 2007) 
The 2006 Commission convergence report had already noted that 
there were potential problems with the Slovene economy, even as Ljubljana 
had clearly fulfilled the Maastricht criteria. On inflation, the report noted: 
In a longer-term perspective, the final convergence of 
domestic interest rates to the euro area level and the possibility 
of an increase of the value-added tax rate envisaged in 2007 
represent risk factors to inflation. Slovenia therefore needs to 
remain vigilant to protect its low inflationary environment and 
a favourable competitiveness position. A more ambitious 
fiscal policy stance would help to mitigate risks to inflation 
and wage moderation should be continued beyond 2006. 
(European Commission 2006: 4) 
 
                                                
16  The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2008: 13. 
17  The Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire, 14 September 2007. 
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The 2006 ECB convergence report also noted 
potential additional second-round effects stemming from 
recent energy price increases, in conjunction with a 
strengthening of domestic demand and possible adjustments in 
administered prices may exert significant upward pressure on 
wages and inflation. A particular uncertainty associated with 
wage developments is that the new wage agreement for 2006 
and beyond has not yet been concluded. (European Central 
Bank 2006: 36) 
Part of the inflation in Slovenia, the report pointed out, could be chalked up 
to price harmonization with the rest of the bloc: “GDP per capita and price 
level are still lower in Slovenia than in the euro area,” and inflation will be 
inevitable to some extent as prices catch up (European Central Bank 2006: 
36). 
EU and ECB authorities have spoken out, calling on Ljubljana to 
rein in inflation, with Economic and Monetary Policy Commissioner 
Joaquín Almunia going as far as saying that Slovenia is sending “a bad 
signal” to potential members (Kraske 2008). In late April, the head of an 
IMF mission to Slovenia, Piritta Sorsa, advised that the country “should 
tighten its budget policy and aim for a surplus this year to curb inflation 
expectations.” She further advised that the government should “avoid 
excessive pay rises, which would only worsen the situation.” Other steps 
that could be taken include the lessening of bureaucratic hurdles, the 
enabling of greater competition, the increasing of labor flexibility and 
further privatization (Novak 2008).  
People are speaking out at home as well. A November 2007 protest 
in Ljubljana saw almost 70,000 people demonstrating against inflation and 
calling for more social justice (Kraske 2008). One strike set for 30 January 
2008 was only called off at the last minute when the government agreed to a 
3.4 percent public-sector wage increase, and another planned for 6 February 
cost the government a 4.7 percent private-sector wage increase and a €20 
increase in the minimum wage (though employers later reneged on the 
deal).”18 However, since productivity is relatively good (registering a 6.1 
percent increase in 2006 and a 7.9 percent increase in 2007), “this suggests 
that a full-blown wage-price spiral is still unlikely, although it is a risk, 
particularly if inflation does not peak in the next month or two, or if 
productivity growth falls.”19 
Beyond just inflation, other problems may also be looming on the 
horizon. On top of everything else, the Commission report also pointed out 
                                                
18  The Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire, 11 March 2008. 
19  The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2008: 13. 
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that the demographic trends in Slovenia put the country in a high-risk 
category in terms of sustainability. Declining birth rates and generous 
pension benefits could ultimately be a recipe for disaster (European 
Commission 2006: 5). The ECB report went further, noting that 
“[a]ccording to the latest projections by the EU’s Economic Policy 
Committee and the European Commission, Slovenia is expected to 
experience a substantial increase in age-related public expenditures 
amounting to 9.7 percentage points of GDP in the years to 2050” (European 
Central Bank 2006: 38).  
It does not seem clear exactly what has happened to create such 
inflation in Slovenia since January 2007, but it is likely a combination of 
several of the factors mentioned above. Since extrapolating the exact factors 
and their weight is an enormous challenge, it is unclear how Slovenia will 
manage, but one thing is clear: the country’s experience so far can be seen 
as a warning to the other eurozone members, who are surely aware of the 
fact that the remaining potential members are all significantly less 
developed and have higher growth rates; this could mean integrating them 
would be far more difficult than has been the case with Slovenia, which is at 
least closer to full convergence with the other eurozone economies.  
 
VII. Conclusion: Quo vadis, eurozone? 
In some ways, Slovenia’s accession to the eurozone is old news—
Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia have since joined. Further, the small size of 
Slovenia’s economy and its relative symmetry with the other eurozone 
members (e.g., Portugal and Greece especially), perhaps differentiate the 
Slovene experience from the rest. These facts certainly facilitated 
Slovenia’s meeting the Maastricht criteria and thereby joining the eurozone, 
but many of the others, are having considerable difficulties.  
The question emerges of whether it is time to change the 
Maastricht criteria. This could be interpreted as changing the rules in the 
middle of the game, or holding potential new eurozone members to a 
different standard than old. However, this would not be the first time such 
discrimination has been practiced—indeed numerous examples could be 
found in the 2004 and 2007 members’ experiences during their accession to 
the EU. Further, if the Maastricht criteria were aligned to OCA theory and 
real economic concerns, it could easily be argued that this would both 
ensure a more stable euro and also a fairer deal for potential new members.  
One more factor certainly bears mention: “There is little solid 
evidence that the euro’s introduction has boosted economic growth, and the 
failure to punish persistent violations of the budgetary rules has seriously 
BRIAN POZUN 190 
undermined the bloc’s claim to promote fiscal stability.”20 Further, the 
power of conditionality to compel reform before eurozone accession 
dissipates almost immediately upon entry into the bloc, as has been seen 
with the pre- and post-accession behaviors of the new members included in 
the 2004 and 2007 rounds of European Union enlargement. If eurozone 
members are going to push for any further reform in the candidate 
countries, it must be accomplished before accession.  
Angelov (2006) argues that, even beyond the issues with regard to 
OCA theory, the Maastricht criteria are bad in another way: the situation 
prevailing when they were drawn up has changed significantly and they are 
now out of synch with actual needs. The EU has doubled and the members’ 
economies are more diverse (in terms of per capita GDP, growth rates and 
even monetary systems: “currency boards, for instance, [were] unknown in 
the EU until the Baltic countries joined the Union in 2004”). He singles out 
the inflation criteria in particular as being discriminatory, as the Central 
European countries have higher GDP growth rates than the older EU 
members, which tends to give them higher inflation. He notes that the high 
growth in Ireland in 2000 and 2001 was similarly accompanied by higher 
inflation; “This means that Ireland, despite the economic miracle that made 
it the fastest growing economy in the EU, would not pass the inflation 
criterion” (Angelov 2006: 82, 84). Even the economies for which the 
Maastricht criteria were drawn up have trouble with them, and so it is no 
surprise that countries with significantly different economies would face 
even greater problems.  
While he believes the best way forward is to amend the inflation 
criterion or even to abolish it, “the slow pace of EU procedures makes that 
far from a practical proposition.” Therefore, Angelov advocates “a more 
radical approach”—“abolish the Maastricht criteria altogether” and allow 
new EU members to join the eurozone immediately. Since the 2004 and 
2007 enlargement countries’ economies are so small, it would not affect the 
monetary union significantly but it would (à la Mundell II) bring significant 
benefits to the new member states (Angelov 2006: 84–85). Since the powers 
that be would be horrified at the prospect of allowing this outright, Angelov 
suggests the new members simply take it upon themselves to get the ball 
rolling: “If some of them do it the European Commission and the ECB will 
be forced to recognise the fact—no one can reasonably expect that a country 
would abandon the euro as its currency so as to fulfill criteria that would 
allow it to once again adopt the euro” (Angelov 2006: 87). He terms this 
move “unilateral euro-ization.” 
Buiter & Sibert (2006a) agree, but take a closer look. They identify 
three costs to unilateral euro-ization: (1) “the entrant would forego the 
                                                
20  The Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire, 3 January 2007. 
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seignorage revenue a country earns by issuing its own currency”; (2) “the 
country would not have a seat on the Governing Council of the ECB”; and 
(3) “the country would have no lender of last resort in the event of a 
financial crisis as it could not print its own euros.” However, the costs under 
(1) would be negligible, the “Governing Council is already so large that it 
cannot function as a meaningful deliberative body,” and problems arising 
from (3) would be rare. Further, they note that while the Commission and 
ECB would object, “they have no legal grounds for opposing it” (Buiter and 
Sibert 2006a: 85, 87).21 
Such an approach would see a jump in eurozone membership 
(though not all would be likely to make the move—Poland, for example, 
seems hesitant about adopting the euro one way or the other). Here it may 
be worthwhile to note that this expanded eurozone could accentuate the 
concerns raised by Feldstein (1997). One was that “[t]he emphasis on 
common economic and social policies will reduce the scope for the 
experimentation and competition that would otherwise lead to reductions in 
the current extremely high levels of structural unemployment.” He also 
predicted tensions between, especially, France and Germany over monetary 
policy (and foreign and military policy should EMU lead to a more 
federalized union). Third, he was alarmed that “[t]he Maastricht treaty 
contains no provisions allowing a country to leave the monetary union once 
it has joined” and therefore “[m]embership in the monetary union and the 
adoption of a single currency is intended to be permanent.” Finally, he 
suggested that were EMU to lead to a more federalized Europe, it could 
upset global balances of power: “Only time would tell whether the creation 
of such a global power would be a stabilizing or destabilizing influence on 
world peace” (Feldstein 1997: 41–42).  
The first caution is worth noting, particularly in the case of 
unilateral euro-ization, but since the unilateral eurozone members would not 
(immediately) be involved in setting policy, they could theoretically 
maintain a bit more room for experimentation. The second issue, however, 
is unlikely and in fact unilateral euro-ization could even unite France and 
Germany in opposition to it. Feldstein’s third concern could actually be 
resolved in the case of unilateral euro-ization, as such a move could 
convince certain eurozone members that formulating an exit option would 
be desirable. The final point, however, could be the most pressing. Were a 
sizable number of states to opt for unilateral euro-ization without causing 
much of a problem, the result would be a eurozone that more closely 
matches the larger EU membership and therefore could lead to a more 
                                                
21  It should be noted as well that Andorra, Montenegro, and Kosovo have already 
unilaterally euro-ized, and while the Commission and ECB have objected, they 
have been unable to prevent the euro from circulating in these two places. A 
precedent, therefore, may already be in place.  
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unified Europe that very well could make more of an impact on the world at 
large, particularly if the unification were extended into foreign and military 
policy as Feldstein notes. None of Feldstein’s concerns, therefore, seem 
overly pressing at this time. 
What will happen to the Maastricht criteria, as well as what will 
happen to Slovenia now that it is within the eurozone are questions for the 
future. It is unlikely, regardless of the low cost and high benefits, that 
unilateral euro-ization will emerge as a viable option. It is likely, however, 
that the Slovene economy will adjust to its new circumstances and will 
ultimately thrive in the eurozone; however, the Slovene economy now 
depends more than ever on developments in the eurozone overall. EMU 
may not be in line with OCA theory, but the psychological benefit noted 
above of the euro increasing a European perspective comes through clearly 
– never before in its young history has Slovenia been so integrated with the 
rest of Europe, and the Slovene authorities can certainly be proud of the 
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